Efficiency indicates that banks run their business activities with relatively low costs. Berger and DeYoung (1997) find that reduction in cost efficiency of the US commercial banks precedes an increase in the future loan defaults. This is caused by managers who are unable to control their operating expenses as well as to practice appropriate daily operations and loan portfolio management. Nonetheless, when a subset of relatively efficient banks is scrutinized, an increase in cost efficiency is followed by a hike in loan defaults, proving the skimping hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, an increase in loan defaults occurs because the banks choose to spend a low price on underwriting and monitoring loans in the short run and bear the risk of having loan performance problems in the future.
Therefore, the OJK supports the BIs macro prudential regulations through its roles in monitoring and assessing individual bank soundness and health indicators not only in the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) but also liquidity, solvability, profitability e
Bank capital also empirically affects the NPL ratio in the opposite direction. On one hand, due to the moral hazard incentive, managers of low-capitalized banks tend to get involved in high-risk loans which area issued through inadequate credit scoring and monitoring (Keeton Morris, 1995). These risky credit activities induce a rise in loan defaults, implying a negative relationship between capital and NPL ratio. Continuer la lecture de 2.2. Regulation on Non-performing Loans (NPLs) in Indonesia